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BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC., ) 
Employer, and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE ) 
FUND, Surety, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
ORDER GRANTING AUGMENTATION 
OF THE RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 42658-2014 
Industrial Commission No. 
IC 2013-024694 
Ref 15-390 
An AUGMENTATION OF THE RECORD with attachments was filed by counsel for 
Appellant on September 1, 2015. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's AUGMENTATION OF THE RECORD be 
and hereby is, GRANTED, and the appeal record shall include the document listed below, a copy of 
which accompanied the Motion, which shall be added to the scanned record: 
1. Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Recommendation from the State 
Industrial Commission. 
DATED this ff day of September, 2015. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
Industrial Commission Secretary 
ORDER GRANTING AUGMENTATION OF THE RECORD Docket No. 42658-2014 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
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BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC., 
Employer, 
and 




FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSION OF LAW, 
AND RECOMMENDATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the 
above-entitled matter to Referee Michael Powers. In lieu of a hearing, the parties 
submitted the issue for resolution on a Stipulation of Facts and briefing. Michael 
Kessinger of Lewiston represented Claimant, and Wynn Mosman of Moscow represented 
Defendants. The matter came under advisement on May 29, 2014. 
ISSUE 
The sole issue to be decided is whether Claimant is entitled to applicable workers' 
compensation benefits for injuries suffered in an automobile accident while returning from 
an IME scheduled by Surety related to Claimant's ongoing workers' compensation claim. 
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SYNOPSIS OF CASE AND CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES 
On September 16, 2013, Claimant suffered a covered industrial accident while 
working for Employer. Pursuant to the ensuing workers' compensation claim, Surety 
ordered Claimant to attend an IME in Post Falls, Idaho on November 15, 2013. On her 
return trip home to Lewiston from the IME, Claimant was involved in an automobile 
accident, which resulted in further injuries. 
The parties dispute whether Claimant's injuries sustained in the auto accident would 
be subject to workers' compensation benefits. Claimant argues under the theory of 
"compensable consequences" the injuries would be covered. Defendants argue the accident 
was an "intervening, independent, responsible, and culminating cause" and therefore not 
subject to workers' compensation coverage. 
RECORD FOR REVIEW 
The record in this matter consists of the Stipulation of Facts and legal briefing 
submitted by the parties. 
After having considered the facts and legal briefs of the parties, the Referee submits 
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law for review by the Commission. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
The undisputed and stipulated facts are set forth below verbatim from the parties' 
Stipulation of Facts. 
1. On September 16, 2013, Claimant Barbara Kelly (hereafter Claimant) was an 
employee of Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc. (hereafter Blue Ribbon), in Lewiston, Idaho. 
At said time, Blue Ribbon was insured for its obligations under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (hereafter Surety). 
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2. On or about September 16, 2013, Claimant, Employer, and Surety were 
subject to the provisions ofidaho's Worker's Compensation Law. 
3. Claimant suffered a compensable workers' compensation injury when a cart 
rolled over her left foot while in the course and scope of her employment with Blue 
Ribbon on September 16, 2013. 
4. Surety paid medical and time loss benefits to Claimant as a result of the 
injury to her left foot. 
5. On or about November 8, 2013, Julie Estes, an agent of Surety, sent Claimant 
a letter, which read as follows: 
We [Surety] have arranged for you to be seen in an 
independent medical evaluation with Robert Friedman. This 
appointment is scheduled for November 15, 2013, at 1: 00 p.m. 
and will be held at Kootenai Health Plaza, which is located at 
1300 East Mullan Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho. 
Please make the necessary arrangements to keep this 
appointment and bring copies of all x-rays/MRI films with 
you. Failure to do so may result in the termination of benefits 
and the responsibility for any "no show" charges. 
You may submit a report of all travel expenses to this office 
for reimbursement. This should include the date traveled, 
destination, and round trip mileage. 
6. It is approximately 125 miles each way from Claimant's workplace m 
Lewiston, Idaho, to Post Falls, Idaho. 
7. Dr. Robert Friedman performs medical evaluations in Lewiston, Idaho. 
Appointments with Dr. Friedman were available in November in Post Falls and in 
December in Lewiston. Claimant was scheduled for the November appointment in Post 
Falls. 
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8. On November 15, 2013, Claimant traveled to Post Falls, Idaho, for the 
surety-scheduled medical evaluation. On said date she was still an employee of Blue 
Ribbon and was receiving time loss benefits from Surety. 
9. Directly after meeting with Dr. Friedman, Claimant began her return trip 
from Post Falls, Idaho, to Lewiston. 
10. Claimant did not make any stops or take any detours on her way home from 
the appointment with Dr. Friedman. 
11. At 3:50 p.m. on November 15, 2013, on US 95 approximately five miles 
south of Potlatch, it was snowing and the road was covered with snow. At said location, 
Claimant was southbound in her Ford Expedition when a northbound Ford Fl50 lost 
traction, crossed the centerline, and collided head-on with Claimant's vehicle. Claimant's 
actions did not cause or contribute to the collision. 
12. As a result of the automobile collision, Claimant suffered severe physical 
injuries to her lower extremities. Due to the extent of her injuries, Claimant's doctor 
restricted her from any weight-bearing on her lower extremities until further notice. As a 
result of the crash, Claimant was in a skilled nursing facility in Lewiston, Idaho, until 
February 28, 2014. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
13. The provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 
956, 793 P.2d 187, 188 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for 
narrow, technical construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 
(1996). 
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Arguments in Javor of applying the compensable consequence doctrine to the 
facts 
14. Claimant relies on the doctrine of compensable consequence as set forth by 
Professor Larson in his treatise Larson's Workers' Compensation Law. (Matthew Bender, 
Rev. Ed.) to support her argument in favor of coverage for injuries she sustained in the 
November 2013 automobile accident. The doctrine states: 
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an 
aggravation of the original injury or a new· and distinct injury, 
is compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a 
compensable primary injury. 1 
1 Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation § 10.01 (Matthew· Bender, Rev. Ed. 
2014). 
15. This concept is easy to apply when the subsequent injury is a complication of 
the primary injury, or treatment of the primary injury leads to a second injury. It is less 
clear how an accident such as the one in question complies with the requirement under 
Idaho law that to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an accident arising out of 
and in the course of employment. An injury is received in the course qf the employment 
when it comes while Claimant is doing the duty which she is employed to perform. It 
arises out of the employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind upon 
consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under 
which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Eriksen v. Nez Perce 
1 
In her briefing Claimant cited as authority the following introductory language for the chapter on compensable 
consequences: "When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every 
natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an 
independent intervening cause contributable to the claimant's own intentional conduct." Claimant excluded the next 
sentence of the introduction, which states; "More specifically, the progressive worsening or complication ofa work-
connected injury remains compensable so long as the worsening is not shown to have been produced by an 
intervening nonindustrial cause." 
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County, 72 Idaho 1, 6,235 P.2d 736,738 (1951). Professor Larson realized the second 
injury might not comply with the requirement that the injury must arise out of and in the 
course of the employment, so he created a concept called "quasi-course of employment" to 
deal with this reality. As he describes it: 
[s]ince in the strict sense, none of the consequential injuries we 
are concerned with are in the course of employment, it 
becomes necessary to contrive a new concept, which we may 
for convenience call "quasi-course of employment." By this 
expression is meant activities undertaken by the employee 
following upon his or her injury which, although they take 
place outside the time and space limits of the employment, and 
would not be considered employment activities for the usual 
purposes, are nevertheless related to the employment in the 
sense that they are necessary or reasonable activities that 
would not have been undertaken but for the compensable 
mJury. 
1 Lex K. Larson, Larson's FVorkers' Cornpensation § 10.05 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 
2014). Applying this "quasi-course of employment" concept, Professor Larson argues that 
when the second injury arises out of a quasi-course activity, such as a trip to the doctor's 
office, the chain of causation should only be deemed broken by the claimant's intentional 
conduct prohibited by the employer. Id. 
16. When applying the concept of compensable consequences, the Commission2 
has observed: 
the application of this rule is almost entirely limited to 
situations where a primary work-related injury is followed by a 
later non work-related injury. The rule is remedial in nature; 
its purpose, under such circumstances, is to assure the worker 
is compensated for the later, non work-related injury by 
providing that such an injury 'likewise arises out of 
employment.' 
2 
The Idaho Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of compensable consequences in a workers' compensation 
setting. 
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Keith v. Connors Logging, Inc. 1990 IIC 0660 at 0660.5. Claimant argues this approach is 
similar to Professor Larson's "quasi-course of employment" standard. 
17. Neither the Commission nor the Idaho Supreme Court has formally adopted 
Professor Larson's "quasi-course of employment" proposal. However, as noted in Lee v. 
JR. Simplot Co., 1996 IIC 0019, "historically, Idaho has followed the natural consequence 
theory of compensability of subsequent injuries." In Lee, the Referee found the claimant 
was engaged in a retraining program agreed to by Defendant when she developed upper 
extremity issues. There was no intervening cause for the complaints. Therefore, Claimant 
was entitled to medical benefits for the upper extremity problems she developed while 
undergoing vocational rehabilitation. Lee at 0019 .4 
18. Claimant argues another way to consider the applicability of the 
compensable consequences doctrine in the present case is under the implied contract 
theory, as articulated in Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130, 379 P.2d 217 
(1963), and cited with approval in Larson. Therein, the Kansas court reasoned that because 
the employer is obligated to furnish medical care to the injured employee, and the 
employee was under a duty to submit to reasonable medical treatment as directed by the 
workers' compensation statutes, the provisions of the act become an implied part of the 
employment contract. Accordingly, accidental injuries occurring during trips made 
pursuant to the act are work connected. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 7 
19. Claimant points out a significant number of jurisdictions follow the rule that 
injuries occasioned while traveling to and from a doctor's office for workers' compensation 
related treatment or examination are covered for workers' compensation benefits.3 
20. Finally, Claimant notes Idaho's contrary case, Kiger v The Idaho Corp. 85 
Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963), was decided prior to Idaho's comprehensive revision of 
the workers' compensation laws, and prior to the Commission's use of the compensable 
consequences doctrine. Claimant argues Kiger (discussed in greater detail below) is 
distinguishable because in that case, the claimant set her own doctor's appointment, and 
was not compelled to attend an appointment when and where directed by Surety. In 
addition, claimant therein was not compensated for her trip. Claimant asserts Kiger 1s 
inconsistent with the current state of the Commission rulings since at least 1990. 
Arguments against applying the compensable consequence doctrine to the present facts 
21. Defendants' chief argument centers around the fact the Idaho Supreme Court 
rejected the notion that an automobile accident occurring while Claimant was traveling to 
or from medical treatment would be a loss covered under the workers' compensation laws 
of this state. The issue was examined in Kiger v. the Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 3 80 
P.2d 208 (1963). Therein, the claimant was injured in an auto accident while driving to her 
doctor's office for treatment of a prior workers' compensation injury. She unsuccessfully 
sought from the Industrial Accident Board (now Industrial Commission) compensation and 
medical expenses resulting from the automobile accident. She appealed the adverse 
3 
Larson lists the following jurisdictions as having so held: California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, Colorado, 
Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Mississippi, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Virginia, New Jersey, New York, and Maryland. 
However, Maryland reversed the cited decision, and does not provide coverage for such accidents. See, Mackin & 
Assoc. v. Harris, 672 A.2d 11 IO (Md. 1996). Conversely, this is not a comprehensive list of states providing such 
coverage, but only those states listed in Larson, which is not current. The point is many states allow for such 
coverage. 
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decision. Quoting from the Oklahoma decision of Farmers' Gin Co. v. Cooper, 147 Okl. 
29, 294 P. 108 (1930), Kiger Court found the automobile accident "was in no sense due 
to the employment, nor did it result from a risk reasonably incident to the employment and 
there is a severance rather than a causal connection between the conditions under which the 
work was required to be performed and the resulting injury." Further, citing to Linder v. 
City of Payette, 64 Idaho 656, 135 P.2d 440 (1943), the Supreme Court reiterated "that if 
there occurs, after the initial accident and injury, an intervening, independent, responsible, 
and culminating cause, the latter occurrence becomes the proximate cause." Concluding as 
a matter of law the automobile accident in question did not arise out of and in the course of 
claimant's employment, the Court affirmed the decision. 
22. Defendants argue that while Claimant herein is critical of the Kiger decision, 
it is still the law in Idaho, and carries controlling weight unless and until it is overruled. 
Furthermore, it is consistent with several other states, including Wyoming, Ohio, and 
Michigan.4 
Analysis and Holding 
23. In addition to the binding effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Kiger, 
there are good policy reasons to deny Claimant's bid for compensation from the subject 
auto accident. Professor Larson's argument is grounded in the notion that the "but for" 
connection is sufficient to allow compensation for secondary injuries in all cases where the 
injury is not occasioned by a claimant's intentional wrongful conduct. This standard is too 
broad. Not only does it require the adoption of the concept of "quasi-course of 
4 As noted previously, Maryland also rejects the notion of coverage for a claimant's trip to and from the doctor's 
office. Oklahoma too, as cited by the Court in Kiger appears to reject the concept. This is not meant to be a 
comprehensive review of rejecting states; the point is several states have not adopted the proposition. 
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employment," a legal fiction which has not been recognized in Idaho, but its literal 
application could well lead to an almost unlimited scope of coverage. As pointed out in 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373 (Wyo. 
1997), which is almost factually identical to the present case ( except the auto accident 
therein resulted in the claimant's death): 
it would be impossible to ever cut off compensability if we 
were to adopt the hearing examiner's interpretation of the 
causation requirement. Would we compensate an employee 
who wrecked her car and died because she fell asleep at the 
wheel while she was on her way to see her doctor? Would we 
compensate an employee who was killed by a drunk driver 
while she was on her way home from her doctor's 
appointment? A logical end would not exist to the causation 
test which the hearing examiner purposes. Furthermore, it 
would lead to too many abuses, and the worker's compensation 
fund would, in effect, become a general health and accident 
insurance fund, a purpose for which it was not intended. 
A causal connection does not exist between the 
employee's initial injury and her car accident. The fact that 
she was returning from a doctor's appointment for an injury 
which she sustained while she was working [ for employer] 
does not translate to a finding that the [ work-related] injury 
caused her death. Certainly, the accident which caused the 
employee's death did not occur because of her work related 
back injury. The accident was not a hazard of her employment 
that she would not have been subjected to apart from her job 
nor did it result from a risk reasonably incident to the character 
of the business. Rather, the accident resulted from a hazard 
that we are all equally exposed to bad road conditions. 
Id. at 377-378. The Bruhn Court also examined, and expressly rejected, the concept of 
quasi-course of employment. Instead, it held that in order for a second injury to be 
compensable, the original compensable injury must be a direct cause of the subsequent 
injury. Id. at 3 78. 
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24. The Marv land court in 1Hackin & Assoc. v. Harris, 672 A.2d 1110 (Md. ; . 
1996) also considered and rejected the carte blanche application of Larson's scope of 
compensable consequences. The A1ackin court reversed a lower court ruling granting 
workers' compensation benefits for an injury that occurred when claimant fell on an icy 
sidewalk while making his way to his physical therapist's office for treatment due to a 
prior industrial accident. In reversing, the court found there was an insufficient legal nexus 
between the first accident and the second to support an additional compensation award. In 
reaching this decision, the court rejected what it called Larson's "contrived" quasi-course 
of employment theory, opting for a rule that to be compensable, the second injury must be 
a direct and natural result of the earlier injury. The court was critical of the notion that a 
second injury will always be compensable if it can be shown that it would not have 
occurred "but for" the first injury. The court listed several hypothetical "legally absurd" 
situations which could arise from this expansive use of the "but for" test. In one typical 
example, the court noted that one could argue that "but for" the fact a claimant was off 
work from an industrial accident, he would not have been at home at the time he tripped 
over the garden hose and injured himself. The M~ackin Court went on to illustrate two 
actual cases from Florida, where the "but for" test is applied broadly. In Dept. of 
Transportation v. King, 554 So.2d 1192 (Fla.App. 1989), the claimant received benefits 
after being struck by a car while she was out walking. She claimed her doctor instructed 
her to take walks in an effort to promote healing of her industrial leg injury, and "but for" 
her initial injury, she would not have been outside walking at that moment. Likewise, in 
Little Caesar's v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.App. 1990), the claimant received benefits 
after his involvement in an auto accident occurring while he was driving home from a park 
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where he had been sw1mmmg. He claimed he was swimming to help him regarn his 
strength, pursuant to doctor's instructions, after his original industrial accident. The 
Maryland court pointed out cases such as these lack a sufficient nexus between the original 
injury and the ensuing harm, but are allowed under a strict "but for" analysis. The A1ackin 
court found the better rule is that the claimant must establish a direct causal connection 
between the original industrial injury and the subsequent injury or condition. 672 A.2d 
1114. 
25. While the Idaho Industrial Commission has applied the concept of 
compensable consequences since at least 1990, it has always done so in relation to a second 
injury being directly and causally tied to the initial compensable injury. For example, in 
Castaneda v. Idaho Home Health, Inc., 1999 IIC 0857, the Commission found the 
claimant's right elbow epicondylitis resulted from her inability to properly use her right 
arm after she broke her right shoulder in an industrial accident. See also, e.g. Nelson v. 
First Interstate Bank 2000 IIC 0914 ( overuse syndrome in right shoulder direct result of 
left shoulder injury); Offer v. Clearwater Forest Industries 2000 IIC 0956 (right shoulder 
injury led to overuse and injury of left shoulder); Quentin2003 v. American Interstate Ins. 
Co., 2003 IIC 023 7 (low back and left leg injuries resulted due to limping caused by right 
knee industrial accident). In short, the Idaho cases have consistently found a direct and 
natural causative link between the original industrial injury and the compensable 
consequence injury or condition. 
26. Conversely, in Vaught v. Mervyn 's 1999 IIC 1284, the claimant was denied 
benefits for a seizure because the Commission found her decision to stop taking her 
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medication served as an independent, intervening cause, thus breaking the causal chain and 
barring her from recovery. 
27. In the present case, there is no causal connection between the original 
industrial injury and the subsequent injuries suffered in the automobile accident. Claimant 
does not argue her original injury in any way contributed to the accident, or her subsequent 
injuries. In cases where the Commission has applied compensable consequence as a theory 
for recovery, the first injury was material to the analysis; the nature of the first injury was 
directly linked to the onset of the second injury. To apply the concept of compensable 
consequence to these facts would greatly expand the scope of its application. 
28. Claimant's argument can be read to suggest a limited exception to the Kiger 
decision for those instances where a claimant is going to or from an appointment whose 
location and time is set exclusively by the surety, with no input or negotiation from the 
claimant, and where, if the claimant does not attend the appointment, her workers' 
compensation benefits will be suspended or terminated. This is an attractive argument 
under the present facts. It is easy to relate to Claimant's plight, where she was required to 
attend an IME over one hundred miles from her home, when the same doctor would be 
conducting those examinations in her town the following month. Compounding the issue, 
the IME was scheduled for a time when snow was certainly possible, and in fact was 
falling, at least as of her return trip. All travelers on US 95 on November 15, not just 
Claimant, were subjected to the same road conditions. 
29. In such a situation, it is hard not to sympathize with Claimant, and easy to 
assign the risk of Claimant's travel to the surety. However attractive, Claimant's 
arguments run contrary to, and in effect overrule a valid Idaho Supreme Court case on 
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point. There is no legal nexus between Claimant's industrial injury and the injuries she 
suffered in the car wreck in question. Idaho has not adopted the "quasi-course of 
employment rule" invented by Professor Larson. The Workers' Compensation Act does 
not provide for the "risk shifting" proposed by Claimant. It is impossible to foresee the 
unintended consequences of such a rule. Certainly, it would expand sureties' 
responsibilities for coverage to a point not contemplated by the statutes. For these reasons, 
Claimant is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits for her automobile accident of 
November 15, 2013. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Claimant is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits for injuries suffered in a 
November 15, 2013 automobile accident while returning from an IME scheduled by Surety 
related to Claimant's ongoing workers' compensation claim. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and 
Recommendation, the Referee recommends that the Commission adopt such findings and 
conclusion as its own and issue an appropriate final order. 
DATEDthis Jl/f'dayof :f~ 2014. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Michael E. Powers,eide~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ___ day of _______ , 2014, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND 
RECOMMENDATION was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
Iv1ICHAEL T KESSINGER 
POBOX287 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
WYNN MOSMAN 
PO BOX 8456 
MOSCOW ID 83843-8456 
ge 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 15 




BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC., 
Employer, 
and 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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